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The potential benefit of policies that eliminate a small likelihood of economic crises is 
calculated. An economic crisis is defined as an increase in unemployment of the 
magnitude observed during the Great Depression. For the U.S., the maximum-likelihood 
estimate of entering a depression is found to be about once every 83 years. The welfare 
gain from setting this small probability to zero can range between 1 and 7 percent of 
annual consumption in perpetuity. For most estimates, more than half of these large gains 
result from a reduction in individual consumption volatility. 
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Lucas (1987) argued that the welfare gains from post-WWII stabilization policies were some-
thing on the order of one-tenth of 1 percent of annual U.S. consumption.1 This paper takes
a di⁄erent approach to gauging the welfare gains from stabilization policies. Instead of fo-
cusing on the gains from a reduction in aggregate variability, it estimates the gains from the
prevention of a Depression-style collapse of economic activity. By focusing on elimination
of economic crises, the paper seeks to incorporate an important goal of real-world stabiliza-
tion policies into welfare discussions. In the U.S. and elsewhere, institutions such as state
insurance of bank deposits, unemployment insurance, and discretionary monetary and ￿scal
policies were a response to the Great Depression. An important goal of these institutions
is to truncate the lower tail of the (probability) distribution of individual-level consumption
processes as opposed to a mean-preserving truncation of both the upper and lower tails.
Thus, the policies have both mean and higher-order e⁄ects. A more complete discussion of
the welfare gains of stabilization policies therefore requires some quanti￿cation of the gains
from an elimination of economic crises rather than simply the gains from a reduction in
aggregate variability.2
Figure 1 further motivates this paper. The ￿gure plots annual unemployment rates for
the period 1900 to 1998. The striking aspect of these time series is the extraordinary rise
in unemployment between the years 1930 and 1939, generally identi￿ed in history as the
Depression years.3 The rise is extraordinary not only because it has not been repeated but
1Most welfare measures constructed along the lines of Lucas suggest that the overall cost of aggregate
variability is relatively small. On this point, see Otrok (2001).
2DeLong and Summers (1988) have previously argued for sizable welfare gains of stabilization policies on
the grounds that such policies ￿￿ll in business cycle troughs without shaving o⁄ business cycle peaks￿and
thereby reduce the average unemployment rate.
3For the period 1900-1940, the Lebergott series for industrial unemployment was constructed by dividing
the total number of unemployed workers reported in Lebergott (1964) Table A-3 by the sum of unemployed
workers and nonfarm workers also reported in that table. The unemployment rates for 1941 and later are
just those reported by the BLS. The Romer series was constructed by applying the corrections suggested by
2also because there is no corresponding episode involving a steep decline in unemployment
rates. Indeed, with an average unemployment rate of about 8 percent in non-Depression
years, it is impossible for the unemployment rate to fall below this average as much as it
rose above it during the Depression. It is di¢ cult to view Figure 1 and not think of the
Depression as a potentially preventable lapse from the normal workings of the economy.
The question posed in this paper is: What fraction of annual consumption would a
worker be willing to pay to set the current probability of encountering a Depression-like
event to zero? To answer the question, we study a model similar to Imrohoroglu￿ s (1989).
There is a unit measure of in￿nitely lived workers with identical preferences. Workers face
idiosyncratic employment opportunities, and the probability of ￿nding employment depends
on the aggregate state of the economy. One di⁄erence is that the data generation process
of our model includes an aggregate state that corresponds to an economic crisis in which
the probability of ￿nding employment in the business sector is much lower relative to the
other aggregate states. We also consider alternative insurance arrangements concerning these
adverse shocks to employment status. In our baseline model, workers cannot buy insurance
against adverse shocks to their employment status in the depression state but can attempt
to self-insure by holding stocks of an asset with a real rate of return lower than the rate
of time preference of workers.4 As a point of comparison we also consider other insurance
arrangements such as complete markets.
We start with an estimate of the current likelihood of depressions ￿ the likelihood that
is set to zero in the welfare experiments. This estimate is obtained by ￿tting a three-
state Markov chain to the observed monthly chronology of expansions, contractions, and
depressions in the U.S. for the period 1900 to 1998. In ￿tting one Markov chain to the
entire period, the paper assumes that the fact that no economic crisis has occurred since
Depression-era stabilization policies went into place re￿ ects luck rather than design. Under
Romer (1986) to the industrial unemployment rate series.
4This assumption on the real return is consistent with the general equilibrium implications of imperfect
insurance, as shown, for instance, by Aiyagari (1994).
3this assumption, the current likelihood of moving into a depression is estimated to be once
every 1000 months (or once every 83 years). With complete markets, the welfare gains from
setting this small probability to zero is 0:97 percent of annual consumption in perpetuity.
Of this total gain, 0:78 percentage points results from an increase in mean consumption and
0:19 percentage points from a reduction in uncertainty (or volatility) in consumption. For
our baseline model with incomplete markets, though, the contribution of lower uncertainty
is much higher ￿1:09 ￿leading to a total gain of 1:87 percent. The contribution of lower
uncertainty is about 5:5 times larger ( = 1:09 ￿ 0:19) under incomplete markets because
households engage in a lot of precautionary savings (self-insurance) during a Depression
episode ￿savings that are dissipated when the economy emerges from a Depression. The
resulting large swing in individual consumption is the main reason why consumption is
considerably more volatile with even a small probability of Depression-like events.
Sensitivity analysis indicates that the gains from elimination of economic crises could
be as low as 1:3 percent or as high as 6:6 percent. Higher estimates are associated with a
larger contribution of reduction in uncertainty. For the experiment that generated the 6:6
percent welfare gain, 80 percent of that gain can be attributed to a reduction in consumption
volatility.
2 Environment
The economy evolves through good (g), bad (b); and depression (d) times that have implica-
tions for employment prospects. The aggregate state of the economy ￿ 2 fg;b;dg is assumed














where, for example, Prf￿t+1 = gj￿t = bg = ￿gb:
4The economy consists of a unit measure of in￿nitely lived individuals who di⁄er at any











where ct consumption in period t, ￿ 2 (0;1) is the discount factor, and ￿ > 0 is the relative
risk aversion parameter.
Individuals are endowed with one indivisible unit of time each period. Each individual
receives an employment opportunity that has one of two states: i 2 fe;ug; where e stands
for the employed state, and u for the unemployed state. If i = e; the individual produces y
units of the consumption good in the business sector, and if i = u, the individual produces
￿y units of the consumption good in the non-business sector, where 0 < ￿ < 1: Without loss
of generality, we set y = 1: The individual-speci￿c employment state also follows a Markov
















where, for example, Prfit+1 = ejit = u;￿t+1 = gg = ￿
g
eu is the probability that an individual
will be employed in good times at t + 1 given that the individual was unemployed in period
t:
Thus the overall employment prospects faced by each individual depend on both the
aggregate and individual states; that is, on the six pairs (￿;i); ￿ 2 fg;b;dg and i 2 fe;ug:
These six pairs are denoted by !1;:::;!6, where !1 stands for ￿employed in a good state,￿!2
for ￿unemployed in a good state,￿!3 for ￿employed in a bad state,￿!4 for ￿unemployed in a
bad state,￿!5 for ￿employed in a depression state,￿and !6 for ￿unemployed in a depression
5state.￿ The process governing ! is also a ￿rst-order Markov process with transition matrix




, where Prf!t+1 = !j j !t = !kg = ￿jk: These transition probabilities are
determined by ￿ and ￿￿. For example, if !t = !1, then the probability of !t+1 = !2; i.e.,
￿21; is given by ￿gg￿
g
ue:
Environments with varying levels of insurance against adverse shocks to employment
status are studied in this paper. Denote the post-insurance income of a worker in state ! in
period t by x(!t). Given the potential incompleteness of insurance markets, workers have an
incentive to self-insure, and it is assumed they can do so by holding stocks of an asset with
zero real return (alternative asset market assumptions are investigated later in the paper).
Individuals enter period t with individual savings st held over from the previous period. An
individual￿ s budget constraint can be written:
ct + st+1 = x(!t) + st; st ￿ 0 (4)
where ct is the individual￿ s consumption in period t.
The maximization problem faced by an individual in this economy can be represented
as a discounted dynamic program. Let s = st; ! = !t; st+1 = s0; and !t+1 = !0: Then, the
Bellman equation for this program is:














c = x(!) + s ￿ s
0 ￿ 0: (6)
The solution to this problem yields decision rules c(s;!) and g(s;w) for c and s0; respectively.
Since individuals face idiosyncratic shocks in the depression state, they may hold di⁄erent
levels of savings. Let ￿t(s;!) be the probability that an individual attains the state (s;!):










where g￿1(s0;!) = fs : s0 = g(s;!)g: Under mild regularity conditions (ergodicity of the
Markov process and the absence of cyclically moving subsets) the sequence of recursively
de￿ned distributions converges to a unique invariant distribution ￿(s;!) from any initial
distribution. The distribution ￿(s;!) gives the fraction of time an individual is in state
(s;!):
3 Mapping the Model to the Data
Estimation of the aggregate state-transition matrix ￿ is presented ￿rst, followed by the
calibration of other parameters of the model.
3.1 Estimation of the Aggregate State Transition Matrix
The starting point of the estimation is a construction of the history of the aggregate states.
This is accomplished by taking the monthly NBER business-cycle chronology since January
1900 and associating NBER expansions with the good state and NBER contractions with the
bad state. This two-state history is then augmented by a third crisis state with a very high
incidence of unemployment. Speci￿cally, all months of any year in which the unemployment
rate exceeded 17 percent were re-classi￿ed as depression months. This de￿nition picks out
the 120 months corresponding to the 1930-1939 period ￿generally known as the Depression
years.5 An alternative de￿nition considered later in the paper classi￿es all months of any
year in which the unemployment rate exceeded 20 percent as depression months.
Given this three-state history, the maximum likelihood estimate of ￿kj; the (j;k)th ele-
ment of the aggregate state transition matrix, is the ratio of the number of times the economy
5Cole and Ohanian (1999) identify the 10 years between 1930 and 1939 as the period during which output
remained below trend.
7switched from state j to state k to the number of times the economy was observed to be in
state j (Ross (1972) pp. 240-242).6 Implementing this procedure for the whole sample yields
the estimate, b ￿; of the aggregate state transistion matrix reported in Table 1 (standard
errors appear in parentheses in the table).7
The estimated matrix has several noteworthy features. First, because there is only one
depression episode in the sample, there is only one transition into and one transition out
of the depression state. Also, the depression follows contractionary months and is followed
by expansionary months ￿hence ￿dg = ￿bd = 0: Second, the estimated matrix implies that
conditional on not being in a depression, the probability of falling into one is about 0:001:8
But the unconditional probability of a depression is 0:0975; which is orders of magnitude
larger than the conditional probability. The large discrepancy between these two probabilities
re￿ ects the fact that the depression state is very persistent. This discrepancy is one reason
why the welfare loss from the possibility of a Depression-like event is relatively large, even
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PT￿1
t=1 1f￿t = jg












t=1 1f￿t = jg
:
7The reported standard errors are asymptotic standard errors and needn￿ t be good estimates of the
sampling variance in ￿small￿samples. To investigate the small sample properties of our maximum likelihood
estimate of ￿, we ran Monte Carlo simulations where the data generation process is given by b ￿. As expected,
the standard errors from the Monte Carlo simulations were larger than the asymptotic standard errors.
Furthermore, we found an upward bias in the estimates of ￿db and ￿gd. Since correcting b ￿ for these biases
only led to higher welfare gains of eliminating the depression-like state, we retained the more conservative
estimates of b ￿ reported in the paper.
8This number was obtained by multiplying the unconditional probability of being in the bad state, which
is 0:2074; by 0:0039:
8though the probability of encountering a Depression-like event, conditional on not being in
one, is quite small.
3.2 Calibration of Other Parameters
The calibration of the remaining parameters involves selecting parameter values for the
elements of the individual-level transition matrices ￿￿; the preference parameters ￿ and ￿;
and the earnings-loss parameter ￿.
The Individual State Transition Matrix
The individual-level state transition matrix for each aggregate state is built up from two
pieces of information pertaining to that state, namely, the average unemployment rate in
that state and the average duration of unemployment spells in that state.
The average unemployment rate in the good, bad, and depression states was ￿xed at the
average unemployment rate for these states in the whole sample. These were 5:33 percent,
7:86 percent, and 23:48 percent, respectively. Since the unemployment rate data are available
at only annual frequencies for the pre-WWII era, the average unemployment rate for each
state was calculated for annual data assembled by Lebergott (1964). All non-Depression
years in which there were at least nine expansionary months were classi￿ed as ￿good￿years
and all other non-Depression years as ￿bad￿years.
The duration of unemployment spells in good and bad times is based on the monthly
average duration of unemployment spells reported by the BLS. These were determined to
be 2:75 months during expansions and 3:75 months during contractions. The only data on
the duration of unemployment spells that we could ￿nd for the Depression were for 1930
and 1931. By early 1930, 56 percent of male unemployed workers had been without work
for at least nine weeks. The special census of unemployment undertaken in January 1931
reported that of the male workers unemployed in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Chicago,
and Los Angeles, 45:3 percent, 60:9 percent, 45:2 percent, 61:0 percent, and 33:2 percent,
9respectively, had been jobless for at least 18 weeks. In e⁄ect, the median unemployment
duration had doubled in less than a year. The fact that the unemployment rate remained
elevated for the next seven years suggests that the median duration of unemployment by
the end of the Depression was probably a lot higher than 18 weeks. The average duration of
unemployment spells in the depression state was ￿xed at 20 months, more than four times
the median duration seen in 1931.
The choice of average duration of unemployment spells for each aggregate state ￿xes ￿
￿
uu




uu). The remaining elements were chosen to match the
average unemployment rate in each aggregate state. Note that the evolution of the aggregate
unemployment rate is given by:
Ut = Ut￿1￿
￿(t)
uu + (1 ￿ Ut￿1)￿
￿(t)
ue (8)
where ￿(t) 2 fg;b;dg: Since ￿
￿
uu etc. depend only on the current state, Ut converges to a
constant if the state remains unchanged for some length of time. For each aggregate state,









We chose the values of ￿
￿
ue;￿ 2 fg;b;dg; so that Ug;Ub; and Ud matched 5:33 percent, 7:86
percent, and 23:48 percent, respectively.
Preference and Earning-Loss Parameters
We set ￿ = 0:9946, which is equivalent to an annual discount rate of 6 percent. We arrived
at this number by assuming a rate of time preference equal to 4 percent at an annual rate as
well as assuming that the constant monthly survival probability is equal to 1 ￿ 1=(40 ￿ 12);
so that individuals have a working life of 40 years. We set the risk aversion parameter, ￿; to
3:
The value of ￿y is given by ￿home production.￿According to Greenwood, Rogerson, and
Wright (1995), ￿attempts to measure the value of the output of home-production come up
10with numbers between 20 and 50 percent of the value of measured market GNP.￿To be
conservative, we set the earning loss parameter ￿ to 0:5 in the baseline calibration.9
4 Welfare Measures
We wish to estimate the aggregate welfare gain from moving to an environment in which the





0:0745 0:9216 + 0:0039
3
5: (10)
The o⁄-diagonal elements of this matrix are identical to the corresponding elements of b ￿;
as is ￿gg: But the probability of remaining in the bad state is now higher by 0:0039, the
probability of moving into a depression from a bad state in the b ￿ matrix. The assumption
here is that stabilization policies prevent ordinary recessions from turning into depressions.
The individual-level transition matrices for the good and bad state remain the same, and
the parameters ￿; ￿; and ￿ are assumed to be the same as well. Let V ￿(s;!) be the value
function for this new, depression-proof economy.
The welfare calculations are done in two ways. Imagine that the three-state economy has
attained its stochastic steady state. At some random date, individuals are given the choice
of living in an environment with ￿￿: At that instant, the economy will be in one of three
possible states, and there will be a joint distribution of individuals across asset holdings
and employment status. In the ￿rst type of welfare calculation, which is our preferred type,
it is assumed that each individual begins the new regime with his current asset-holding
and employment status. In addition we assume that if the economy is in the good or bad
state, then the new regime begins in that state. But if it is in the depression state, then
9Darby (1976) pointed out that workers engaged in government relief programs during the Depression
were counted as unemployed. Darby also reports that the average wage earned by these ￿unemployed￿
workers during the years 1930-1939 was about 41 percent of the average wage during those years, which is
lower than our baseline calibration of 50 percent.
11it begins in the bad state as well. Under these assumptions, the fraction of consumption
an individual would be willing to give up if he is currently in state (s;!) is 1 ￿ ￿(s;!),
where ￿(s;!), ! ￿ 4, solves V (s;!) = ￿(s;!)1￿￿V ￿(s;!); and ￿(s;5) and ￿(s;6) solve
V (5;!) = ￿(5;!)1￿￿V ￿(s;3) and V (6;!) = ￿(6;!)1￿￿V ￿(s;4); respectively. The aggregate




! b ￿(s;!)￿(s;!); where b ￿(s;!) is the invariant
measure for the three-state depression-prone environment. In the second type of calculation
it is assumed that each individual is o⁄ered the average lifetime utility of the depression-
proof environment. In this case ￿SS(s;!) solves V (s;!) = ￿SS(s;!)1￿￿ ￿ V ￿ for all s;! where




! ￿￿(s;!)V ￿(s;!) with ￿￿(s;!) being the invariant distribution of the two-state




! b ￿(s;!)￿SS(s;!): This latter measure is referred to as the steady-state gain in welfare
and has been used before by Imrohoroglu. The di⁄erence between the preferred measure and
the steady-state measure is that the former takes account of the transition path to the new
depression-proof steady state.
5 Welfare Gains Under Alternative Insurance Arrangements
In what follows, the two welfare measures are calculated for environments with alternative
market arrangements. The results for all these experiments are collected in Table 2.
5.1 Welfare Gain With Complete Markets
As an important point of comparison, the welfare gain is calculated ￿rst for the case where
unemployment insurance is available in all states, i.e., an individual￿ s post-transfer income
in state ￿ is (1 ￿ U￿) + ￿U￿; for ￿ = g;b;d: Since this leaves only aggregate uncertainty to
play a role, this e⁄ectively corresponds to the representative agent case.10
10The aggregate unemployment rate is not equal to U￿ in the ￿rst few months following the economy￿ s
arrival into state ￿: However, switches between aggregate states are relatively rare and convergence to U￿
always rapid. Living with this minor discrepancy avoids putting U as another state variable in the dynamic
program.
12The top entry in Table 2 reports the operating characteristics of the full insurance econ-
omy in the depression-prone and depression-free regimes. In both regimes, eliminating unin-
sured employment risk eliminates the need to save. The uncertainty in post-transfer earnings
in both regimes is too low relative to the cost of saving (the di⁄erence in the rate of return
on savings (zero) and the rate of discount (6 percent, annualized)) to motivate people to
save. Eliminating the depression state raises mean consumption from 0:9628 to 0:9704 and
reduces the standard deviation of consumption from 0:027 to 0:005: The gain in aggregate
welfare according to our preferred measure (labeled TG for total gain) is 0:97 percent and
according to the steady state measure (labeled SS) it is 0:98: The steady state measure is
higher because for currently unemployed people, the unconditional probability of being un-
employed is signi￿cantly lower than the conditional probability of being unemployed. Only
the former matters in the calculation of the steady state measure.
The ￿nal column (labeled RU) gives an estimate of the welfare gain that is due to the
reduction in uncertainty. Observe that the increase in mean consumption (0:0076 units) is
0:78 percent (= 0:0076 ￿ 0:9704 ￿ 100) of mean consumption in the depression-free regime.
Since people will pay exactly 0:78 percent of mean consumption to obtain this increase, we
may infer that approximately 19:6 percent (= (0:97 ￿ 0:78) ￿ 0:97 ￿ 100) of total gain in
welfare is due to reduction in volatility.11
5.2 Welfare Gain With Partial Insurance (Baseline)
The middle entry in Table 2 reports the results for the economy in which there is full insurance
against unemployment in the good and bad states but there is no insurance against unem-
ployment in the depression state; i.e., the post-transfer earnings of workers are (1￿U￿)+￿U￿
11It￿ s worth noting that our representative agent estimate of 0:2 (= (0:98 ￿ 0:78)) percent for the steady
state welfare gain resulting purely from a reduction in volatility is very close to Lucas￿ s (representative agent)
estimate of the welfare gain from elimination of pre-WWII cyclical volatility. As noted in Lucas (1987) (pp.
26-28), variance in de-trended (log) aggregate consumption in the pre-WWII era is 0:0015; which, when
multiplied by 1
2￿ for ￿ = 3; gives a welfare gain estimate of 0:0023; or 0:23 percent.
13for ￿ = g;b but 1 and ￿ for employed and unemployed workers, respectively, in the depres-
sion. This baseline environment is motivated by the thought that a depression will adversely
a⁄ect asset markets as well. In particular, consider a world with two kinds of assets, one of
which is issued by the business sector and the other by the government. In normal times, the
return on the business-sector asset is close to the rate of discount, while the return on the
government asset is zero. In a depression, the return on the government asset is still zero,
but the business-sector asset becomes worthless. In this situation, workers will accumulate
stocks of the business-sector asset to self-insure against the risk of unemployment in normal
times but use the government asset to insure against unemployment during depressions. If
the rate of return on the business sector asset is close to the rate of discount, we know from
Bewley (1977) that workers will accumulate enough of the business-sector asset to almost
perfectly self-insure against unemployment risk during normal times. A rough way of captur-
ing this situation is to simply assume that both employed and unemployed workers receive
the per capita endowment in the good and bad state (so there is no risk of earnings loss due
to unemployment in these times) but confront workers with the risk of earnings loss due to
unemployment in depressions.
The total welfare gain is 1:87 percent of consumption per month (or per year) and the
steady state gain is 1:70 percent. To put these numbers in perspective, note that Lucas es-
timated the welfare gain from eliminating all cyclical volatility in the postwar era to be 0:01
percent of consumption and Imrohoroglu estimated it to be 0:3 percent. These authors com-
puted steady state gains, so the relevant comparison is with the steady state gain measure.
Thus the gain from getting rid of a Depression-like state is 170 times Lucas￿ s (1987) estimate
of the gains from eliminating cycles and about 6.5 times Imrohoroglu￿ s (1989) estimate.12
We ￿nd that the welfare gains from eliminating depressions vary approximately linearly
with the likelihood of encountering a depression. If the true likelihood of encountering a
12The total gain from elimination of the depression state depends on the value of ￿: When this number is
set closer to the value assumed in Imrohoroglu (0:25), the total welfare gain is around 20 times her estimate
of the cost of business cycles.
14Depression-like event was actually once every 1600 years (rather than once every 83 years),
that would cut the estimated welfare gains by a factor of about 20. Note that if the true
likelihood of encountering a depression was really once in 1600 years, the chance of encoun-
tering a depression episode in an 83-year sample would be around 5 percent. Thus, a welfare
gain of around 0:094 percent (= 1:87 ￿20) corresponds to the lower bound of a 95 per-
cent con￿dence interval of our point estimate. Even under a most conservative estimate of
the likelihood of depressions, the welfare gain is more than nine times larger than Lucas￿ s
estimate of the welfare gain from eliminating cycles.
These large gains stem from three sources. First, average asset holdings go from being
0:41 of monthly earnings in the depression-prone regime to 0 in the depression-free regime.
Because the di⁄erence between the total gain in welfare and the steady state gain is 0:17
percent, it follows that at least 9:1 (= (1:87￿1:7)￿1:87￿100) percent of the total welfare
gain is due to the fact that individuals need to hold fewer assets in the new regime.13
Second, average consumption rises by 0:0076 units (same as in the complete markets case)
in the depression-free regime. Thus, the increase in mean consumption accounts for 41:7
(= (0:78 ￿ 1:87) ￿ 100) percent of the total welfare gain. Third, the volatility of individual
consumption is lower by a factor of 10 in the depression-free regime. Since the ￿rst two
e⁄ects account for 50:8 percent of the total gain, we can infer that the remaining 49:2
percent of the gain must be due to reduction in the variance of consumption and changes
in other higher-order moments of the consumption process. Thus the single most important
contributor to the total welfare gain is the reduction in the volatility of the consumption
process. However, since the only reason individuals accumulate a bu⁄er stock of assets is
to dampen ￿ uctuations in consumption, the reduction in uncertainty associated with the
13As noted earlier, the di⁄erence between the total and steady state gains also re￿ ects the fact that the
unconditional probability of unemployment is lower than the conditional probability of unemployment for
someone who is currently unemployed. This fact tends to raise the steady-state measure above the total
measure. Therefore, the welfare gain attributable to asset decumulation is actually somewhat greater than
noted in the text.
15elimination of the depression state accounts for 58:3 (= 9:1 + 49:2) percent of the total
welfare gain.
The most dramatic di⁄erence in the operating characteristics of the two regimes is in
the volatility of individual-level consumption. In the depression-free regime, the volatility of
consumption is low because unemployment insurance makes the volatility in an individual￿ s
post-transfer income equal to the cyclical volatility in per capita earnings. The cyclical
variability in per capita earnings is low enough that individuals do not ￿nd it in their interests
to accumulate the zero-return asset to bu⁄er their consumption against these ￿ uctuations.
In the depression-prone regime, individuals do not ￿nd it optimal to accumulate assets in
the two non-depression states, even though they are aware that if the depression materializes
unemployment insurance will cease. Consequently, when a depression does materialize, the
consumption paths of all individuals change dramatically. Those who become unemployed
at the start of the depression are the worst a⁄ected: they have no bu⁄er stock of assets and
no insurance and their consumption moves down with their earnings one-for-one. Those who
continue to be employed recognize the possibility of earnings loss due to unemployment and
also reduce their consumption in an e⁄ort to accumulate a bu⁄er stock of assets. These big
drops in consumption of both unemployed and employed people contribute to the relatively
high volatility of individual consumption in the depression-prone economy.14
Figures 1 and 2 show the simulated paths of unemployment and per capita consumption
implied by our model.15 In Figure 2, the simulated path shown by the dashed line assumes
that all of the non-business-sector income received by an unemployed individual is included
in measured GDP. Under this assumption, per capita consumption drops about 16 percent
14These changes in individual and aggregate consumption occur even though a depression is assumed not
to a⁄ect the earnings of employed and unemployed agents.
15The consumption series is based, in part, on the annual Kendrick real consumption series for 1889-1953
reported in Appendix B of Gordon (1986), de￿ ated by population. The percentage deviations shown in the
￿gure are taken from a quadratic trend. In both ￿gures, the lightly shaded bars correspond to the bad state
and the darker bars correspond to the depression state.
16but gradually recovers to a decline of about 10-12 percent by the end of the Depression. The
recovery occurs because the rate of asset accumulation by workers begins to decline as workers
get closer to their target bu⁄er stock of assets (of about 8 months of employed income).
Another factor that contributes to the recovery is that workers who become unemployed
later in the Depression experience less of a decline in consumption because they have higher
levels of precautionary savings. Figure 2 also shows that when the model economy emerges
from the Depression, per capita consumption rises sharply above trend as workers reduce
their precautionary savings. The dotted line displays a similar pattern but the pattern is
more pronounced because, in this case, for unemployed individuals only consumption in
excess of non-business-sector income is included in aggregate consumption and real GDP.
As is evident, these two cases ￿bracket￿the actual decline in per capita consumption during
the Depression.16
The fact that a signi￿cant welfare gain from elimination of the depression state comes
from a reduction in consumption volatility gives our ￿ndings a ￿ avor similar to more recent
studies of the welfare cost of business cycles. Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2001) and
Krebs (2003) show that the welfare gain fromthe elimination of cyclical variation in uninsured
idiosyncratic risk can be quite large if permanent income shocks are an important component
of this risk. While we don￿ t model permanent idiosyncratic income shocks, unemployment
during a depression and the depression itself are quite persistent states. People who become
unemployed during a depression can expect their income to be low for a relatively long period
of time, a fact that contributes to the volatility of consumption in the three-state economy.
5.3 Welfare Gain With No Insurance
The next to last row in Table 2 presents the results for the case where there is no unemploy-
ment insurance in any aggregate state. The total gain in welfare from the elimination of the
depression state is now 1:56 percent and the steady state gain is 1:4 percent. With regard to
16If it is assumed that 23 percent of non-business-sector income goes unmeasured, the cumulative loss in
consumption between 1930-1945 in the model matches that in the data.
17the contribution of the three di⁄erent channels, the reduction in precautionary savings con-
tributes about 10:3 (= (1:56￿1:4)￿1:56) percent, the increase in mean consumption (which
is still 0:78 percent of average consumption in the depression-free economy) contributes 50 (
= 0:78￿1:56 ) percent, and the remaining 39:7 percent results from a reduction in variance
and other changes in the higher-order moments of the consumption process.
The reason gains are somewhat lower than in the partial insurance case is evident from
the behavior of asset holdings. Because individuals now face the risk of earnings loss from
unemployment in all aggregate states, they ￿nd it in their interests to accumulate a bu⁄er
stock of assets not only in the depression state but also in good and bad states. One
consequence of this behavior is that when the depression materializes, all individuals are
somewhat better prepared than in the partial insurance (baseline) model; individuals who
lose their jobs at the start of the depression now have some savings to cushion the blow,
and individuals who continue to remain employed have only to add to their existing bu⁄er
stock of assets rather than start from scratch. The key lesson here is that improvements in
risk-sharing that are unlikely to survive a depression-like event make it more important to
eliminate the possibility of such events through stabilization policies.
5.4 Welfare Gain Under Autarky
The last row in Table 2 presents the results for the case where individuals have no insurance
against unemployment and cannot save. The fact that workers cannot save reduces their
life-time utility in both the depression-prone and depresssion-free regimes ￿witness the large
increase in consumption volatility in the two regimes. It is interesting to compare this case to
the previous case where there is savings but no insurance. The gains are larger in comparison
￿indicating that the opportunity to save lowers the bene￿t from elimination of economic
crises. In a sense, self-insurance is a substitute for stabilization policies.
186 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we report the sensitivity of our results to changes in key parameter values.
The results are collected in Table 3. The ￿rst set of results are those from the baseline
model. The next line reports results if the income in the unemployed state is set at 20
percent of income in the employed state (this is the lower bound on the income from home
production reported in the Greenwood, Rogerson and Wright study mentioned earlier). As
one would expect, average consumption is now lower, average savings higher, and volatility
of consumption higher than in the baseline model. The total gain (TG) from eliminating the
depression state is now 6:59 percent while the steady state (SS) gain is 6 percent. With regard
to the sources of the gain, the ￿nal column reports the combined percentage contribution
due to reduction in uncertainty (the contribution from the decumulation of assets plus the
contribution from the reduction in volatility of consumption ￿labeled RU), which is 80:4
percent of the total gain in welfare.
The next experiment reduces the relative risk aversion parameter to 1:5: Relative to the
baseline model, average asset holdings fall, and there is a modest decline in the volatility
of consumption. Predictably, the welfare gain estimates are now lower, with the total gain
being 1:3 percent and the steady-state gain 1:22 percent. The contribution due to reduction
in uncertainty is 40 percent.
In the third experiment, depression months were rede￿ned to be all months of any year
in which the unemployment rate exceeded 20 percent. Now, the period 1930-1939 is broken
up into two depression episodes: one between 1930 and 1935 and another between 1937
and 1938. This has the e⁄ect of lowering the persistence of a depression state but raises
the conditional probability of encountering a depression. These changes roughly o⁄set each
other, leading to a modest decline in the welfare gains from elimination of the depression-like
state. The contribution of reduction in uncertainty to this gain is about 61 percent.
In the fourth experiment, income is permitted to grow at a 2 percent annual rate. There
19is a modest increase in the welfare gains from elimination of the depression state relative
to the baseline model and also a modest increase in the percentage contribution from the
reduction in uncertainty.
In the ￿fth experiment, the average duration of unemployment in the depression state was
lowered to 10 months. Surprisingly, this had a relatively small e⁄ect on the welfare gain. The
reason is that any shortening of the average duration needs to be o⁄set by an increase in the
probability of entering unemployment in the depression so as to keep the average depression
unemployment rate at 23:48 percent. The o⁄set in the incidence of unemployment roughly
cancelled the welfare e⁄ects of changes in unemployment duration.
Finally, two other experiments (not reported in the table) were conducted. In one ex-
periment the return on the asset was allowed to vary with the occurrence of a depression.
In particular, the asset was viewed as money, and it was assumed that at the onset of the
depression the real value of money rose (because of a fall in the price level) while at the end
of the depression it fell (because the decline in the price level is reversed). Again, the overall
change in welfare gains was small. In the ￿nal experiment, the asset was assumed to have a
2 percent rate of return instead of zero, but this too had a very small e⁄ect on welfare.
7 Conclusion
Many macroeconomists believe that unemployment during the Great Depression was socially
very costly. Yet, welfare cost measures of unemployment constructed along the lines of
Lucas (1987) suggest that the overall cost of business cycles, the Great Depression included,
is relatively small. This paper approached the welfare-cost debate from a di⁄erent angle
and sought to obtain an estimate of the cost of low-probability Depression-like episodes. It
was found that these costs are quite large. For the U.S., the probability of moving into
a Depression-like state was estimated to be about once in every 83 years and the welfare
gain from setting this small probability to zero ranged between 1:3 to 6:6 percent of annual
consumption, in perpetuity. For the baseline calibration, the welfare gain was estimated to
20be 1:87 percent, with 58 percent of this gain coming from changes in second and higher-order
moments of the consumption process, including a substantial decline in its variance. Higher
estimates of the gain imply larger contributions from the induced reduction in consumption
volatility.
While this paper quanti￿es the potential gain from pursuing policies that reduce the
likelihood of economic crises, it does not say anything about the potential costs of doing
so. To take that step would require a theory of economic instability. This is a contro-
versial issue, but one plausible theory locates the source of instability in the di¢ culties of
coordinating trade. One in￿ uential example of such a theory is Diamond￿ s (1982) model of
uncoordinated trade in which he showed that pessimism about the possibility of meeting
trading partners can lead to self-ful￿lling trade collapse. Another in￿ uential example is Di-
amond and Dybvig￿ s (1983) theory of bank runs, in which pessimism about the likelihood
of getting one￿ s money back can lead to self-ful￿lling banking panics. Both models suggest
microeconomic interventions that can eliminate these undesirable outcomes, with deposit
insurance in the Diamond-Dybvig model being a clear example. If these models are relevant
for thinking about real-world economic crises, it is the cost of microeconomic interventions
such as deposit insurance that would have to be weighed against the bene￿ts of eliminating
the likelihood of economic crises. A further example where coordination problems are asso-
ciated with a ￿nancial collapse that spills over to the real side of the economy is present in
Cooper and Corbae (2002). In their environment, adding liquidity to the banking system
is a form of stabilization policy that can overcome strategic uncertainty and avoid ￿nancial
collapse. In this case, the cost of eliminating crises is negligible.
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c ￿(c) TG SS RU
Full Ins. 0:00 0:9628 0:027 0:00 0:9704 0:005 0:97 0:98 19:4
Partial Ins. 0:41 0:9628 0:056 0:00 0:9704 0:005 1:87 1:70 58:3
No Ins. 2:23 0:9628 0:072 1:86 0:9704 0:054 1:56 1:40 50:0
Autarky 0:00 0:9628 0:017 0:00 0:9704 0:014 1:79 1:82 58:1
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c ￿(c) TG SS RU
Baseline 0:41 0:96 0:07 0 0:97 0:01 1:87 1:70 58:3
￿ = 0:2 1:47 0:94 0:09 0 0:95 0:01 6:59 6:00 80:4
￿ = 1:5 0:17 0:96 0:06 0 0:97 0:01 1:30 1:22 40:0
U ￿ 0:20 0:23 0:96 0:05 0 0:97 0:01 1:58 1:48 60:8
2 % Growth 0:25 0:96 0:06 0 0:97 0:01 1:96 1:80 59:9
Duration=10 0:37 0:96 0:05 0 0:97 0:01 1:69 1:57 53:8
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